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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/appellee,

:
Case No.

V.

:

ROBERT WELLS THOMPSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

960388-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Based on a conditional guilty plea, defendant was convicted
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994 & Supp. 1995), a third
degree felony, and possession of methamphetamine in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995), a third
degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Under Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), may
police conduct a pat-down search of the companion to a lawful
arrestee if police reasonably believe that the companion may be
armed or pose a risk to the safety of the police or others?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to
deny a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard.

State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992).

Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if the trial court's
factual findings are not adequately supported by the record,
"resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable
to the trial court's determination."
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d

A trial court's legal conclusions based

on its factual findings, are reviewed for correctness, being
afforded no deference.

Pena, 869 P.2d at 939; Brown, 853 P.2d at

855.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16(1995)
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily
for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon
if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in
danger.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert Thompson, was charged in an information
with possession of marijuana, a controlled substance, with intent
to distribute in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994 & Supp.
1995); possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, in
a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995); and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(2) (1994)
(R. 9) •
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence discovered from a
pre-arrest search of defendant's person (R. 21). At a hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court heard testimony
from the two police officers who arrested defendant (R. 78-155).
The trial court made a specific finding that the officer
conducted a pat-down search of defendant because the officer was
concerned for his safety (R. 44)• The trial court then concluded

3

that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant might
pose a threat to their safety, that the pat-down search was
justified under the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88
S. Ct. 1868 (1968) and State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App.
1993), and that the search was further justified by the officers'
need to secure the arrest scene for officer safety while
arresting his companion, Timothy Lamoreaux (R. 44-45) .
Based on the foregoing, the trial court denied defendant's
motion to suppress.

The trial court issued specific findings of

fact and conclusions of law as required by rule 12 (c), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure (R. 43-45).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, and to preserve the
suppression issue for appeal, defendant entered a conditional
guilty plea to a reduced charge of possession of marijuana, a
controlled substance, with intent to distribute, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994 &
Supp. 1995), and possession of methamphetamine, a controlled
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (R. 49-56, 157-170).1

The

*The minute entry for the change of plea hearing erroneously
states that the defendant changed his plea to "not guilty." (R.
58). This is clearly a clerical error in view of the transcript
of the plea colloquy in which defendant unequivocally pleads

4

trial court dismissed the charge of unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone (R. 49-56, 157-170).
Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent indeterminate
terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 6263).

The execution of the sentence was suspended and defendant

was placed on probation (R. 63). Defendant filed a timely appeal
from the trial court's judgment (R. 72).
STATEMENT OF PACTS
On December 17, 1995, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Officers
Bud Walker and Dray Savage of the Provo City Police Department
arrived in an unmarked car at the trailer home of Timothy A.
Lamoreaux to serve Lamoreaux with a no-bail felony arrest warrant
for the distribution of illegal drugs (R. 84, 86). The officers
had a Xerox copy of a photograph of Lamoreaux to help identify
him (R. 84).
Upon reaching Lamoreaux's residence, the officers approached
the trailer on foot (R. 85). Officer Savage could see Lamoreaux
with another man through a lit window in the trailer (R. 85, 109110).

Officer Walker walked up the sidewalk leading to the front

guilty to the two charges (R. 166-67) and in view of the
Conditional Plea Agreement and Certification prepared by
defendant's counsel (R. 59-61).
5

door while Officer Savage moved along the side of the trailer
toward the rear door to prevent Lamoreaux from escaping through
the back door (R. 85, 110-111).
The front door opened as Officer Walker approached, and
Lamoreaux exited the trailer with defendant (R. 86). Officer
Walker immediately stepped behind a tree to avoid detection (R.
86-87).

Officer Walker moved out and confronted Lamoreaux when

Lamoreaux and defendant were only a few feet away (R. 87).
Officer Walker told Lamoreaux that he was under arrest and began
to place handcuffs on him (R. 87-88).

Defendant immediately put

his hands down to his sides, placing at least one of them into
his pocket (R. 88-89).

Defendant appeared to be unnaturally

tense and he attempted to move out of the police officer's view
(R. 89). As Officer Walker talked to Lamoreaux, he tried to keep
an eye on defendant because he was concerned for his safety (R.
89-91).

Lamoreaux asked Officer Walker if defendant could take

some personal property on Lamoreaux's person to Lamoreaux's
parents (R. 88). Officer Walker ordered defendant to remain
nearby (R. 44) .
While Officer Walker was speaking with Lamoreaux, defendant
moved into the shadows toward the rear of the trailer where he
encountered Officer Savage (R. 44, 91, 112-13).
6

Initially,

because of the darkness, Officer Savage could not identify
defendant (R. 112). However, as defendant came closer, the light
from Officer Savage's flashlight enabled the officer to identify
defendant as the man he had seen earlier with Lamoreaux through
the lit window (R. 113). Officer Savage did not know that
Officer Walker had contacted Lamoreaux and defendant, nor did he
know why defendant had come around to the back (R. 113). Officer
Savage believed that defendant might have come to the back
because he wanted to re-enter the trailer from the rear to help
Lamoreaux escape (R. 113). Officer Savage watched defendant
return to Officer Walker's location in the front (R. 114).
Officer Savage joined defendant in the front after walking around
the back of the trailer and up the other side (R. 113-114).
Officer Savage apparently went around because his equipment
prevented him from squeezing through the narrow space that
defendant had traveled through (R. 111-114).
After returning to the front, Officer Savage asked defendant
for identification, which he provided (R. 114-15).

Officer

Savage then checked to see if defendant had any outstanding
warrants (R. 115). Defendant continued to keep one hand in his
pocket and to act evasive and nervous throughout his encounter
with Officers Walker and Savage (R. 115). Officer Savage asked
7

defendant if he could pat him down for weapons (R. 116).
Defendant replied, uNo" (R. 116). Officer Savage did not search
defendant, but watched him while Officer Walker finished
arresting Lamoreaux (R. 116).
Once Lamoreaux was secure, Officer Walker asked defendant if
he had any weapons on him or anything that would hurt Officer
Walker (R. 93, 105). Defendant did not respond (R. 93) . Officer
Walker repeated the question and defendant again failed to
respond (R. 93, 105-106).

Officer Walker walked over and touched

defendant on the shoulder and repeated the question for the third
time (R. 93) . Defendant started to pull away and stated, "Yes"
(R. 93). Officer Walker grabbed defendant by the arm and
positioned him up against the car and instructed him to place his
hands where the officer could see them (R. 94). Officer Walker
then patted defendant down for weapons (R. 94).
While patting defendant down, Officer Walker felt a metallic
object in one of defendant's jacket pockets which proved to be a
scale (R. 94). Officer Walker also felt and observed a large,
plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance, which
protruded from the pocket by about an inch (R. 94). Officer
Walker did not remove these items from defendant's pocket, but
continued to pat him down to search for weapons, which according
8

to the officer's testimony would be anything larger than the
scale previously felt (R. 95-96) . During the pat-down search,
Officer Walker again asked defendant if he had anything on him
that was going to hurt the officer (R. 94-95).

Defendant

replied, "Yes, I have syringes" (R. 95). Officer Walker then
asked defendant, "Are there drugs? Are they with meth or coke?"
(R. 95)• Defendant answered that the syringes had had
methamphetamine in them (R. 95).
Officer Walker placed defendant under arrest for the
marijuana that Officer Walker discovered during the pat down and
because of defendant's admission about the syringes (R. 96).
Because Officer Walker was concerned about being pricked by the
reported syringes, Officer Walker did not immediately retrieve
the discovered items, but he removed defendant's coat and placed
him in handcuffs (R. 96)•
One week prior to this incident, Officer Walker had been
involved in another drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic
weapons were seized (R. 89-90).

Both officers testified that in

their experience drugs and guns were commonly seized together (R.
44, 89-90, 117).

9

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Police may conduct a pat-down search of the companion of a
lawful arrestee, even though there is no reason to believe that
the companion is involved in criminal activity, so long as the
officer can point to specific, articulable facts that lead the
officer to reasonably believe that the companion may be armed and
dangerous.

Whether an officer's belief is reasonable depends on

an objective standard, viewed under the totality of the
circumstances.

Officers in this case had a reasonable belief,

under the totality of the circumstances that defendant may be
armed and pose a threat to the officer's safety.

The need to

contain the arrest scene for a narcotics violation to protect
police officers is one factor of many to be considered when
determining whether the officers' actions were reasonable.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual
findings, but attacks the trial court's conclusions that Officer
Walker's pat down frisk of defendant was justified under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and State v. White. 856
P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), and that the officers were further
justified in the pat down frisk because of their need to secure
10

the arrest scene, which included the yard area in which the
defendant was detained (R. 44). The State will address each
issue in order.
POINT I
THE OFFICER'S PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED
UNDER TERRY V. OHIO BECAUSE UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THE OFFICERS HAD A REASONABLE BASIS FOR
BELIEVING THAT DEFENDANT POSED A RISK TO THEIR SAFETY
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court held that a police officer need not
have probable cause to stop and frisk a person when the officer
"observes unusual conduct" which leads the officer to reasonably
conclude that "in light of his experience" the person stopped is
involved in criminal activity and "may be armed and presently
dangerous."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.2

Terry

established a two-step inquiry when evaluating a warrantless
protective seizure: 1) was "the officer's action justified at its
inception," and 2) was the officer's action "reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
2

Utah has codified the Terry holding at Utah Code Ann. §777-16, which states: "A peace officer who has stopped a person
temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous
weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in
danger." However, actions taken under this code provision are
subject to the requirements set forth in Terry. State v. Roybal.
716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986).
IX

the first place."

Terry. 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.

In

other words, there must be a reasonable basis for both the stop
and the frisk for the search to be valid.

Id.: State v. Carter.

707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985).
Defendant essentially argues that the officers' action in
stopping defendant was "not justified at its inception" because
the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity by the defendant that would allow them to lawfully
detain him (Brief of Appellee [Br.App.] at 9). In support of his
contention, defendant points to Officer Savage's testimony below
that he suspected no "criminal activity on the part of defendant"
(R. 123)(Br.App. at 9).

Defendant asserts that for the detention

and subsequent search of defendant to be justified, the facts of
this case must fall within an exception of the exclusionary rule
(id.).

Defendant acknowledges that a frisk for weapons under the

requirements of Terry is such an exception to the exclusionary
rule (id. at 11), but asserts that the officers in this case did
not actually fear for their safety as demonstrated by their
actions.

12

A. A police officer may conduct a pat-down search of the
companion of an arrestee even though the officer does not
suspect the companion of criminal activity, if the officer

reasonably believe? that the cpmpgmiQp m^y be armefl QX ppse
a yigk tQ the safety of the officer QT others.
While as a general rule it is true that an officer may not
lawfully detain a person absent probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion that the person stopped is involved in criminal
activity, Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, a slightly
different rule attains in cases where the officer is lawfully
arresting a companion to that person.

See United States v.

Flett. 806 F.2d 823, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Menard. 95 F.3d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1996); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 261-64 (1996).

Although the United

States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of Utah have not
directly addressed the applicability of Terry to the search of a
companion of an arrestee, several federal circuit courts and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals have. As a general rule,
those courts have held that under Terry, a search of a companion
of an arrestee is proper when under the totality of the
circumstances, the officer could point to specific, articulable
facts that led the officer to reasonably conclude that the
companion might be armed or pose a risk to the safety of the
officer or others.

United States v. Menard. 95 F.3d 9, 10-11
13

(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Whitfield. 907 F.2d 798, 799
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Flett. 806 F.2d 823, 826-27
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell. 762 F.2d 495, 498-99 (6th
Cir.), cert, denied. 474 U.S. 853, 106 S. Ct. 155 (1985); United
States v. Tharpe. 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc),

overruled in part on other grounds by United States v, Causey/
834 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v.
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971); Lewis v. United
States. 399 A.2d 559, 561 (D.C. 1979) .

These courts have not

required that the officer have a separate articulable suspicion
of criminal activity by the companion of the arrestee before
being able to detain and search the companion. See Flett. 806
F.2d at 828 (upheld frisk of friend present in arrestee's home,
even though no indication that friend was involved in criminal
activity); Bell, 762 F.2d at 501 (upheld frisk of companion of
arrestee even though no evidence that companion was involved in
criminal activity); Berryhill. 445 F.2d at 1193 (upheld search of
wife's purse for weapons even though wife not suspected of
criminal activity); Jones v. United States. 544 A. 2d 1250, 1251
(D.C. 1988)(protective frisk of passenger upheld in absence of
suspicion of criminal activity by passenger); see also LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 263-64 (even if companion not
14

under sufficient suspicion to be legitimately seized,
circumstances may still indicate officer should take appropriate
precautions for safety).
Thus, in these types of cases, the court's initial inquiry
is not whether the companion is suspected of criminal activity,
but "whether the officer was rightfully in the presence of the
party frisked so as to be endangered if that person was armed,
and whether the officer had a sufficient degree of suspicion that
the party to be frisked was armed and dangerous,"

Flett, 806

F.2d at 828 (quoting United Stfrte? v, Cl^y, 640 F.2d 157, 159
(8th Cir. 1981)).

Therefore, if the police officer has

legitimately stopped the arrestee, the only issue is whether the
officer reasonably believed under the standards set forth by
Terry that the arrestee's companion posed a risk to the safety of
the officer or others.
In this case, defendant does not dispute that Officer Walker
and Savage had a valid warrant for Lamoreaux and that they were
justified in going to the home of Lamoreaux to serve that
warrant.

Because defendant was with Lamoreaux when the arrest

warrant was served, the officers were "rightfully" in the
presence of defendant "so as to be endangered" if defendant was
armed.

Flett. 806 F.2d at 828; Clay. 640 F.2d at 159.
15

B. Under the objective standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio,
the officer reasonably believed that defendant might be
armed and dangerous.
Defendant argues that the pat-down search of defendant was
not justified because although "the officers both testified
repeatedly that the reason for the detention and the frisk of
defendant was because they were concerned for their safety, their
actions demonstrate otherwise" (Br.App. at 12). Defendant
asserts that the officers were not actually concerned for their
safety as required by Terry, and points to the officers' delay in
conducting the pat-down search (Br.App. at 12). Defendant
finally asserts that by the time Officer Walker searched
defendant, "any possible concern for officer safety had
dissipated by a lack of suspicious activity by Thompson, who
simply wanted to leave the scene" (Br.App. at 13).
Terry held that the reasonableness of a pat-down search must
be judged by an objective standard, i.e., "whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger."

State v.

Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883).

Under this objective standard, contrary

to defendant's argument, it does not matter that the officer was
not in actual fear at the time of the search.
16

State v. Roybal.

716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986); Carter, 707 P.2d at 659; Tharpe,
536 F.2d at 1101. Nor does the officer need to be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed.
Carter. 707 P.2d at 659.

Roybal. 716 P.2d at 293;

The officer need only be able to

articulate specific facts, which when viewed with rational
inferences from those facts justify the officer's belief that the
individual posed a risk to the safety of the officer or others.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; Carter. 707 P.2d at
659; State v. White. 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1993); State v.
Rochell. 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1993); Flett. 806 F.2d at
826-27.

Finally/ in weighing the objective facts before it, the

court must give due weight to the officer's experience.

Terry.

392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883; Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483;
State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88-89; Flett. 806 F.2d at 827.
There are a variety of factors that courts have considered
in determining the overall reasonableness of an officer's actions
in conducting a pat-down search.

No one factor controls, but the

facts must be viewed in their totality.

Carter. 707 P.2d at 659.

Some of the factors that have been considered by courts to
support an officer's reasonable belief include the failure to
obey an officer's reasonable command, Bell. 762 F.2d at 501
(companion of arrestee refused to put hands on dashboard or exit
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car as commanded); hesitation in answering an officer's question
of M o you have a weapon," Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483; the darkness
of the area of the arrest scene, Menard, 95 F.3d at 11-12
(protective search made on lonely road, late at night); Tharpe.
536 F.2d at 1100 (officer was alone late at night in poorly lit
area); furtive or sudden movements, State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d
979, 984 (Utah App. 1979) (occupants of car reached under seat);
nervousness exhibited by the persons lawfully detained, Lewis v.
United States, 399 A.2d 559, 561 (D. C. 1979)(companion of man
carrying gun wrapped in sweater appeared nervous when questioned
by police); large bulge in pocket, Carter. 707 P.2d at 660;
Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483; accompanying an arrestee for narcotics
violation or known drug dealer, Menard, 95 F.3d at 11; Bell, 762
F.2d at 500-01; Flett. 806 F.2d at 827; United States v. Del
Toro, 464 F.2d 520, 521 (2nd Cir. 1972).
Defendant's argument that the officers' actions did not
support their testimony that they were concerned for officer
safety contradicts the specific finding of the trial court that
Officer Walker frisked defendant

u

[b]ecause Officer Walker was

concerned for his safety" (R. 44).

Defendant has not challenged

the trial court's factual findings on appeal, but has only
attacked two of the court's conclusions made based on the facts
18

before it (Br.App. at 2, 7). In any event, Terry does not
require that the officer feel fear before a pat-down search is
justified.

Roybal. 716 P.2d at 293; Carter, 707 P.2d at 659;

Tharpe. 536 F.2d at 1101. As explained, Terry established
objective criteria as the standard, not the subjective fear of
the officer.

"Evidence that the officer was aware of sufficient

specific facts as would suggest he was in danger satisfies the
constitutional requirement."

Tharpe. 536 F.2d at 1101.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances that existed at
the time of defendant's detention and search, the trial court had
sufficient evidence to find and to correctly conclude that both
officers had an objective, reasonable basis to believe, in light
of their experience, that defendant might be armed and that he
posed a risk to their safety.

The trial court found that both

officers testified that in their experience drugs and guns were
commonly seized together (R. 44, 90, 117). Officer Walker
testified that one week prior to defendant's arrest, he had been
involved in a drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic weapons
were seized (R. 44, 89-90).

See Bell. 762 F.2d at 500 (officer

testified that in his general experience narcotics transactions
frequently involved weapons); Del Toro, 464 F.2d at 521 (officer
testified that based on 15 years police experience and 7 years
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experience in narcotics enforcement, drug dealers were usually
armed and often accompanied by armed body guards); Flett. 8 06
F.2d at 827 .(officer with 18 years experience testified that drug
cases were treated differently from other cases).

Thus, in going

to serve an arrest warrant for felony distribution of illegal
drugs, the officers could reasonably believe, as the trial court
concluded, that Lamoreaux and any of his companions could
possibly be armed.
In addition, upon being contacted by Officer Walker,
defendant's hand immediately went into his pocket where it stayed
throughout his contact with the officers (R. 88, 115). Defendant
moved into the shadows where it was difficult to see him towards
the rear of the trailer despite Officer Walker's command to
remain nearby (R. 44). Defendant did not immediately respond
when asked by Officer Walker if he had any weapons or anything
that would hurt the officer, and when he did respond he said,
"yes" (R. 93-94, 105-06).

See Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483 (court

upheld frisk of defendant on totality of circumstances, including
defendant's hesitation in answering "no" when officer asked if he
had any weapons)•

Taken together, in light of the officers'

experience, these facts support the trial court's conclusion that
there was a reasonable basis for the officer's belief that
20

defendant might be armed and dangerous.
Defendant has suggested that the search was not justified
because the officers' delay in frisking defendant dissipated any
possible concern for officer safety that they might have had
because of a lack of suspicious activity by defendant, "who
simply wanted to leave the scene" (Br.App. at 13). The fact that
the officers did not immediately search defendant does not negate
the other facts occurring after the initial contact that support
the trial court's conclusion that officers had reasonable belief
that defendant might be armed.

See Menard. 95 F.3d at 11

(officer's delay in frisking defendant did not confirm that there
was no particularized suspicion to frisk).

Terry held that an

officer who lawfully detains a person to investigate criminal
activity and who reasonably believes that the person detained may
be armed and dangerous, and
where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.
Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85 (emphasis added).
Defendant's conduct from the moment of his initial contact with
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Officer Walker until the frisk did nothing to dispel Officers
Walkers' and Savages' reasonable apprehension that defendant
might be armed.

In fact, defendant's conduct escalated from

putting his hand in his pocket, to walking to the rear of the
trailer as if to re-enter the trailer, to not immediately
responding and then saying "yes" when asked if he was armed or
had anything that would hurt the officer.

The progressive events

in this case heightened any initial fear that the officers may or
may not have had until they reasonably believed that defendant
posed a risk to them.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, there

is nothing in the record that supports the statement that
defendant "simply wanted to leave the scene" or that he conveyed
that desire to the officers (Br.App. at 13).
Because the totality of the circumstances support the
officers' reasonable belief that defendant might be armed and
dangerous, the trial court correctly concluded that Officer
Walker was justified under Terry in conducting a pat-down search
of defendant.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICERS WERE
JUSTIFIED IN SECURING THE ARREST SCENE FOR OFFICER SAFETY
AND THEREFORE WERE JUSTIFIED IN FRISKING DEFENDANT IS ONE
FACTOR OF MANY TO BE CONSIDERED.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding
that ubecause the officers were effecting a valid arrest of
Lamoreaux, they were justified in securing the arrest scene,
which included the yard area in which Defendant was detained.

In

securing the scene for officer safety, the pat down frisk was
further justified" (R. 44) .
To the extent that the trial court was stating a blanket
rule that police officers may frisk all persons who happen to be
in proximity to an arrestee, defendant's argument is correct
under Yfrflyra vT Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979),
reh'g <fenie<3, 444 U.S. 1049, lOO S. Ct. 741 (1980) . In Ybarra.
the United States Supreme Court held that police were not
justified in searching a bar patron who happened to be present
when police arrived to execute the search of a bar pursuant to a
valid search warrant.

The Court held that "a person's mere

propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to
search that person."

Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S. Ct. at 342
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(emphasis added).

The Court also held that the search of the bar

patron was not permissible under Terry because the state could
not articulate any specific facts that would lead the police to
reasonably believe that the patron was armed and dangerous.
Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 93, 100 S. Ct. at 343. The implication in
Ybarra is that if the officers had been able to articulate any
specific facts that supported a reasonable belief that the
defendant was armed and presently dangerous, a pat-down frisk
would have been appropriate.

Id.

The trial court's conclusion, however, may not be as broad
as defendant asserts.

The trial court made specific findings

pointing to facts that Officer Walker was reasonably concerned
for his safety.

Before making the challenged conclusion, the

trial court first concluded that the officers' restraint of
defendant was initially for their safety; that based on the
warrant for Lamoreaux's arrest and the officers' previous
experience with drugs and guns, the officers had a reasonable
suspicion that defendant may pose a threat to their safety; that
the pat-down search of defendant was conducted for officer
safety; and that the pat-down search was justified under Terry
and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) (R. 44). The
trial court then prefaced the conclusion complained of with "Also
24

. . . ." implying that this was merely an additional factor that
the court considered and weighed in making its decision (R. 44).
Thus, the trial court's conclusion can reasonably be read to mean
that the need to secure the arrest scene was only one more factor
that the trial court considered with all the other relevant
factors in determining that the officers' actions were
reasonable.

While securing an arrest scene does not give police

officers a carte Jblanche to search everyone who happens to be
present at the scene, Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 94-95, 100 S. Ct. at
343-44, the fact that a narcotics arrest is being made is a
factor to be considered in conjunction with other factors that
the officer's safety may be at risk.

See e.g., United States v.

Menard, 95 F.3d 9 (8th Cir. 1996); United StflteS vf Pell, 762
F.2d 495, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1985); United Stfrteg v. Pel TorP, 464
F.2d 520, 521 (2nd Cir. 1972); United States v. Flett. 806 F.2d
823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986).
Even if the trial court's conclusion is error, there is no
harm to defendant as the trial court was correct in its
conclusion that the search of defendant was justified under

Terry-
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CONCLUSION
The trial court was justified on the basis of the evidence
in finding and concluding that the officers' belief that
defendant might have been armed was reasonable, thereby
justifying their frisk of him under Terry.

Further, the trial

court's conclusion that the officers were justified in frisking
defendant because of their need to secure the arrest scene was
not error because it was only one factor of many that the trial
court weighed in concluding that the pat-down search of defendant
was reasonable.
The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress should be
affirmed.
RESPECFULLY SUBMITTED this 5~

day of December, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

LAURA B. DUPAIX
Assistant Attorney General
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Appendix A

IK TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 961400017
RULING

ROBERT W. THOMPSON,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the file, considered
the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the
following:
RULING
FINDING OF FACTS
On December 17, 1995, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Officers Bud Walker and Dray
Savage went to the home of Timothy Lamoreaux to serve an arrest warrant on him. The
warrant had been issued for felony distribution of drugs. Officer Walker went to the front
door of the mobile home in which Lamoreaux lived, while Officer Savage went to the rear to
cover the back door. As Officer Walker approached the front door, Lamoreaux and
Defendant exited the home; at that point, Officer Walker informed Lamoreaux of the arrest
warrant and handcuffed him.
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Officer Walker ordered Defendant to remain nearby, but Defendant slowly walked
toward the other side of the home, into the shadows. Officer Savage met Defendant in the
dark and ordered him to return to the front of the home where Officer Walker and
Lamoreaux were located. One week prior to the arrest, Officer Walker had been involved in
a drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic weapons were seized. In addition, the officers
testified that drugs and guns were commonly seized together. Because Officer Walker was
concerned for his safety, he conducted a pat-down frisk of Defendant's outer clothing,
during which time Officer Walker asked Defendant whether anything could harm him as he
frisked Defendant. Defendant responded that he had syringes in his jacket pocket.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The officers' restraint of Defendant was initially for their safety. Based on the

warrant for Lamoreaux's arrest and on the officers' previous encounters with drugs and
guns, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may pose a threat to their safety.
2.

Officer Walker's pat down frisk of Defendant was therefore conducted for

officer safety.
3.

Pursuant to the requirements outlined by Terry v. Ohio. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)

and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Officer Walker's pat down frisk
was justified and therefore valid.
4.

Also, because the officers were effecting a valid arrest of Lamoreaux, they

were justified in securing the arrest scene, which included the yard area in which Defendant
was detained. In securing the scene for officer safety, the pat down frisk was further
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justified.
5.

Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 86 S.Ct 1602 (1966) and State v. Streeter.

900 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), before conducting a custodial interrogation, arresting
officers must apprise a defendant of several constitutional rights. Officer Walker's preMiranda question was not to interrogate Defendant; rather, he posed the question to insure
his own personal safety. The question and resulting answer, therefore, did not violate
Miranda's protections.
6.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress is therefore DENIED.

Counsel for the State is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court
for signature.
Dated this JL

day of March, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

RANDALL K. SPENCER
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
JOHN L. ALLAN
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
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